Russians can't fight a war — tales told by the Western media (INFOGRAPHICS)

Russians can't fight a war — tales told by the Western media (INFOGRAPHICS) | Русская весна

“Russian Spring” goes on dismissing sweeping accusations against Russian Armed Forces (concerning their equipment level) contained in the aticle “How a Russia vs. NATO war would really go down” published in American The Week.

Let’s remind: article’s author Kyle Mizokami, ethnic Japanese living in San Fancisco (USA) claims that Russia is “just a shadow of former Soviet Union” and it can hardly be NATO’s rival.

In the first part of our analysis we denied Mizokami’s allegations concerning dire financial situation in Russian army and Moscow’s lack of funds for modernization. 

Read also: "Just a shadow of Soviet Union" — US media persuade their readers that NATO prevailes over Russia (PHOTOS, VIDEO)

This part is dedicated to American author’s attempt to confirm his sweeping accusations with analysis of Russian army’s performance in Chechnya.

So after speculations on alleged problems Moscow has with financing army modernization Mizokami passes onto military personnel trainng level: “​Russian forces are also, generally speaking, not as well trained as NATO forces”.

As an evidence he provides examples of combat actions in Chechnya where «Russian forces performed badly” and peace-enforcement operation in Georgia in 2008: “In its 2008 war with Georgia, Russian ground forces moved painfully slowly”. ​

According to him “Russian lack of training, preparation, and modern equipment was a major factor. Most NATO countries could have done a better job”. 

In other words he believes that any NATO country’s army even apart from its allies in case of an armed conflict would show better training level and technical equipment and would perform combattasks more quickly and efficiently than Russian forces. 

However it is worth mentioning that even Western military experts’ estimates were far more conservative when they assessed Russian army’s military potential.

The point is that neither of NATO members have combat experience against proper, well-trained and well-equipped armies on their own territories. 

Neither of them was forced to refuse heavy artillery implementation or missile and bombing raids experiencing correspondent manpower losses to avoid civilian deaths. 

Decisions on implementation this or that weapon made outside their territories were easy enough. First of all they always had choice: stay or leave (which Russian command did not have), and secondly: Western generals were never bothered by civilian victims and number of them.

Losses of American coalition in Iraq

Let’s remind that over the whole American campaign in Iraq number of civilian victims amounted between 250 and 655 thousand (they are direct and indirect losses admitted as a result of combat actions by US-led coalition within specified time).

Despite significant estimation dicrepancy it is obvious that even the most moderate claculations do not speak in favour of America.

The American command voices modest numbers of “just” 113 thousand killed civilians.

The same may be said about losses in Vietnam, Afganistan, Lybia, Somalia and Yugoslavia as well as in dozens of minor military operations  performed by Washington since middle of the last century — number of civilian victims was not Washington’s primary concern.

Was it really so bad in Chechnya?

It’s interesting that in Instructons for US ground forces «Urban operations» published in June 2003 a lot of atention is paid to the experience gained by the Russian military during urban combats in Chechnya.

Instructons’ authors underlined that urban clashes are prototype of the war of future: a war between regular armed forces and irregular armed groups. They said that only Russians have enough experience in this area at the present moment.

The Instruction dwells on urban combat problems: “During Chechnya conflict of 1994—1995 Russian forces faced difficulties of distinguishing between Chechen terrorists and Chechen civilians.

External characteristics were of no help that is why the Chechen terrorists moved freely around the town, appeared and dissappeared suddenly opening fire from basements, windows or dark lanes.

To detect terrorists The Russian military had to check men’s shoulders searching for bruises (as a result of small arms fire) or forearms searching for burns (result of fired cases falling and touching the skin). They also had to check suspected men’s cloths to detect stains and smell characteristic for weapon usage.

To detect artillery servicemen Russian soldiers checked folds and cuffs of sleeves in search of stains from touching shells and mortars.

The Russian military demanded from Grozny residents to show their pockets checking silver and lead glance — result of keeping bulks of cartriges. Chechen grenadiers and mortar gunners were detected by the Russian soldiers by threads and rags residue on their clothes (rags are used to clean the weapon).

«US army command need to develop similar methods to detect threat», — American military experts say.

So all the problems connected with urban combat have been little-known for NATO servicemen and remain such. But Iraqi war experience (outside their own territories with active participation of armed and organized opposition forces which got the most burden of ground operations) cannot be compared to what the Russian army had to face.

So any Washington’s claims concerning Russian army’s “failure” in Chechnya are unconstructive until they show their skills under the similar conditions.

Mizokami’s laughable claim concerning «Russian forces moving painfully slow» during peace-enforcement Georgia operation of 2008 will be debunked in the third and the final part of our analysis.

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